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NOTE 
The “Raised Eyebrow” Test Produces 
Further Head-Scratching: Punitive Damages 
in Ondrisek v. Hoffman 
698 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2012) 
VALERIE SHANDS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s the federal courts have struggled with how to address 
the perceived increase in the amount and frequency of punitive damages 
awards.
1
  The Supreme Court of the United States finally created a judicial 
test to determine when an award was so excessive that it violated due pro-
cess,
2
 yet it remains ambiguous and difficult for lower courts to apply.
3
  The 
test involves weighing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions, the 
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and the comparable 
criminal and civil punishments typically imposed upon a similar bad actor.
4
 
The most weight is to be given to the reprehensibility prong.
5
  The ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages is supposed to be close to 4:1, or if the 
  
 * B.A., University of Kansas, B.A.  J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2014. 
 1. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he frequency and size of [punitive damages] awards 
have been skyrocketing.”); Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Cur-
rent Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 23 (tracking the growth of 
punitive damages awards in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 2. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Only when an 
award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation to these interests 
does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”). 
 3. See generally Neil B. Stekloff, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive Due 
Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v. Gore, 29 CONN. L.     
REV. 1797, 1817 (discussing how the judicial test “do[es] not provide much guidance        
to future courts in reviewing punitive damages awards for substantive due process 
violations”). 
 4. Gore, 571 U.S. at 574-75. 
 5. Id. at 575. 
1
Shands: Shands: Raised Eyebrow Test
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Shands – Final Formatting – 1/23/14 Created on:  1/27/2014 6:36:00 PM Last Printed: 1/27/2014 9:12:00 PM 
918 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
case involves substantial compensatory damages, 1:1, but at all times certain-
ly less than 10:1.
6
   
The Eighth Circuit has used the test for the past eight years to varying 
effect.
7
  The circumstances of the instant case, Ondrisek v. Hoffman, lent 
themselves well to the possible re-evaluation of how the Eighth Circuit    
applies the Supreme Court’s test.  Ondrisek is unique in that the Defendant’s 
actions are the most reprehensible reviewed by the Eighth Circuit since       
the test was revised in 2003.
8
  This case, therefore, gave the Eighth Circuit   
an opportunity to clarify the application of the test and set forth clear stand-
ards by using Ondrisek as a high-water mark against which future cases  
could have been be measured.  Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit did not  
seize this opportunity and kept a previous, less reprehensible case as its high-
water mark.   
Although the Eighth Circuit declined to make any changes, Ondrisek 
remains an excellent opportunity to review the court’s punitive damages ju-
risprudence and detect trends in its application.  When compared to other 
Eighth Circuit cases since the Supreme Court laid out the punitive damages 
test, Ondrisek reveals that the Eighth Circuit tends to consider cases with 
“substantial” compensatory damages to be $500,000 and over,
9
 whereas the 
Supreme Court tends to consider “substantial” to be $1 million and over.
10
  
While the Eighth Circuit has a lower threshold for what constitutes “substan-
tial” compensatory damages, it will more frequently apply a ratio higher than 
1:1, despite the Supreme Court’s contrary recommendation.
11
  Furthermore, 
the Eighth Circuit tends to emphasize the ratio prong of the test, not the rep-
rehensibility prong, as the most important factor.
12
  The Eighth Circuit also 
de-emphasizes the third prong of the test, comparable criminal and civil pun-
ishments, to such an extent that it is sometimes completely omitted.
13
 
Ondrisek reveals that although the Eighth Circuit uses the same test as 
the Supreme Court, it certainly applies it differently.
14
  When comparing 
Ondrisek and other Eighth Circuit cases, one sees a subtle pattern that diverg-
  
 6. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); Gore, 
517 U.S. at 581; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991). 
 7. Compare Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 603 
(8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 1:1 ratio was proper), with Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 
F.3d 1020, 1030 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding a 10:1 ratio unconstitutional), and Haynes v. 
Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding a 2,500:1 ratio proper). 
 8. See infra Appendix A. 
 9. Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 10. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008); State Farm, 538 
U.S. at 425. 
 11. See infra Part V.B. for a chart depicting the application of the Gore Guide-
posts in Eighth Circuit Cases. 
 12. See infra Part.V.B.2. 
 13. See infra Part V.B.4. 
 14. See infra Part V.C. 
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es from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  However, these differences are 




II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
A. Background 
 
In Ondrisek v. Hoffman, two eighteen-year old escapees from a religious 
cult sued the group’s leader for battery, outrage, and conspiracy.
16
  Spencer 
Ondrisek and Seth Calagna, Plaintiffs, were both raised in Tony Alamo 
Christian Ministries (TACM),
 17
 an obscure religious sect led by Tony Alamo,
 
18
 a self-professed “spiritual leader” and “prophet” of God.
19
 Alamo and 
TACM espouse a variety of “unorthodox religious beliefs,”
 20
 such as polyg-
amy, child brides, public beatings, compulsory fasting for children, and gov-
ernment conspiracy.
21
 Alamo also taught that those who leave TACM be-
come homosexuals and go to hell.
22
  Alamo had complete control of mem-
bers’ finances
23
 and instituted a variety of rules that resulted in near-complete 
isolation from the outside world.
24
  At age eight, the Plaintiffs were made to 
work several hours per day without pay,
25
 which allegedly grew to forty 
hours per week by age fifteen, and seventy hours per week by age eighteen.
26
  
Both boys endured considerable physical and verbal abuse.
27
  The Plain-
tiffs alleged that they had to listen daily to “rebuke tapes,” wherein Alamo 
told TACM members that they would never amount to anything and would go 
to hell.
28
  Alamo himself told Ondrisek as a child that if he disobeyed, he 
  
 15. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.  
Hoffman v. Ondirsek, 133 S. Ct. 1820 (2013). 
 16. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 17. Id. at 1023. 
 18. Id. at 1020.  Tony Alamo is the pseudonym of Bernie Hoffman.  Id. at 1023. 
 19. Appellant’s Opening Brief Amended, Ondrisek, 698 F.3d 1020 (No. 11-
3003), 2012 WL 948049, at *2. 
 20. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1028. 
 21. Brief of Appellees, Ondrisek, 698 F.3d 1020 (No. 11-3003), 2012 WL 
1029825, at *2-6. 
 22. Id. at *5.  
 23. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1023. 
 24. Id.  This included not traveling outside of the TACM compounds unaccom-
panied, not speaking to outsiders unless it was to “witness,” not attending public 
school, not watching television, and not listening to the radio.  Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *7. 
 27. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024. 
 28. Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *6. 
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would be enlisted in the military and shot.
29
  Moreover, Alamo even admitted 
to having the Plaintiffs “hit in the face, with open handed slaps” fifteen to 
twenty times, then “hit with a wooden paddle” by an adult twenty to forty 
times.
30
  This happened on multiple occasions when the Plaintiffs were as 
young as twelve.
31
  The bases for these punishments were minor offenses, 
such as horseplay or talking about Harry Potter.
32
  These serious beatings, 
carried out at Alamo’s direction by his enforcer, John Kolbeck, resulted in 
bruising, blood, and swelling that did not abate for days or weeks, and even 
resulted in permanent damage.
33
  These beatings were so severe on one occa-
sion that Ondrisek passed out and Calagna vomited on himself.
34
  The beat-
ings were not exclusive to the Plaintiffs; at age fourteen, Calagna was forced 
to watch as his elderly father was beaten until he was crying and could not 
stand or crawl.
35
  Both Plaintiffs contemplated suicide, “unable to imagine 
that death would be worse” than what they had to suffer through on a daily 
basis.
36
  The boys escaped separately from the compound at age eighteen, but 
remain plagued by nightmares, flashbacks, and other psychological issues.
37
 
Ondrisek v. Hoffman was not the first lawsuit brought in connection 
with TACM and Alamo.  Plaintiffs also sued the enforcer who actually hit the 
boys, Kolbeck, in a separate suit, resulting in a damages award of $500,000 in 
compensatory damages and $1 million dollars in punitive damages for the 
Plaintiffs.
38
  In an earlier case, Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, 
Alamo was sued for battery and the emotional distress of two other boys.
39
  
An adult hit the boys with a paddle 10 times and 140 times respectively, in 
very much the same circumstances as the Plaintiffs were abused in 
Ondrisek.
40 
 The first boy received $1,000 in compensatory damages and 
$5,000 in punitive damages, and the second received $50,000 in compensato-
ry damages and $500,000 in punitive damages (a 5:1 and 10:1 ratio respec-
tively).
41
  The district court characterized Alamo’s conduct as “monstrous” 
and “cold blooded.”
42
  Throughout the years, the Secretary of Labor has re-
peatedly sued TACM for not paying its workers, improper recordkeeping, and 
  
 29. Id. at *7. 
 30. Appellant’s Opening Brief Amended, supra note 19, at *5-6, *13. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024. 
 33. Id.  Ondrisek has permanent scarring and damage to his hand.  Id. 
 34. Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *12, *15. 
 35. Id. at *10-11. 
 36. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Brief of Appellees, supra note 22, at *12-13, *18. 
 38. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1030. 
 39. 748 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Ark. 1990). 
 40. Id. at 697, 699. 
 41. Id. at 698-99. 
 42. Id. at 698, 700. 
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other labor law violations.
43
  More recently, Alamo was convicted and re-
ceived a 175-year sentence and $250,000 in fines
44
 on “10 counts of trans-
porting minors across state lines for illicit sex.”
45
  These minors were known 
in the media as “child brides” who had been “spiritually wed” to Alamo when 
they were allegedly as young as eight.
46
  
B. At Trial 
The Plaintiffs sued Alamo in Federal Court, alleging battery, outrage, 
and conspiracy.
47
  At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plain-
tiffs, awarding $3 million each in compensatory damages and $30 million 
each in punitive damages, which the district court declined to remit.
48
 
Alamo raised four points of error on appeal: first, that he should be 
found not liable under the First Amendment freedom of religion clause; se-
cond, the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in his proposed 
instruction on battery, which included a statement about corporal punishment 
being a complete defense to battery; third, that there was insufficient evidence 




On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and re-
versed in part.
50
  It summarily dismissed Alamo’s first three claims.
51
  As to 
his First Amendment freedom of religion claim, the court merely noted that 
freedom of religious belief was not absolute and does not extend to permitting 
“injuries to the ‘equal rights of others.’”
52
  It also held that any error on the 
part of the district judge in not instructing the jury about corporal punishment 
as a complete defense to battery was harmless and did not affect the amount 
  
 43. See, e.g., Brock v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 842 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 
1998) (affirming a district court award of relief for employees under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act); Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 
1983) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to the Foundation due to its 
commercial purpose, and as such, its employees were covered by the Act’s provi-
sions), aff’d Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).  
 44. Jon Grambell, Tony Alamo, Evangelist, Sentenced to 175 Years for Sex 
Crimes, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2009, 8:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2009/11/13/Tony-Alamo-Evangelist-Sen_n_357709.html. 
 45. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 46. Women: We were Child Brides in U.S., CNN (June 23, 2010, 9:15 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/06/23/o.child.brides.stories/index.html. 
 47. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1031. 
 51. Id. at 1024-27. 
 52. Id. at 1024. 
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of compensatory damages.
53
  With regard to Alamo’s claim that his conduct 
did not rise to the level of outrage, the court held that they did not have the 
power to review this point because it was not preserved for appeal.
54
  
Next, the court turned to the issue of the compensatory damages.
55
  It 
determined that “[t]he jury properly weighed the evidence, finding that Ala-
mo continually verbally and physically abused Ondrisek and Calagna” and 
that Alamo’s part in orchestrating and supervising the beatings “justif[ied] the 
compensatory damages awarded against him.”
56
  Finally, the court weighed 
the jury’s 10:1 punitive damages ratio.
57
  Under the Gore factors for punitive 
damages,
58
 the court determined that this case was one of “extreme reprehen-
sibility” and “justif[ied] significant punitive damages,” but found the $30 
million in punitive damages to be excessive due to the high punitive-to-
compensatory damages ratio.
59
 It remitted that amount to $12 million each (a 
4:1 ratio).
60
  In remitting the punitive damages award, the Eighth Circuit held 
that no matter how reprehensible the defendant’s actions, a ratio of 10:1 can-
not be sustained, and Eden Electrical remains the high water mark. 
61
  
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip was the first case in which 
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause may require limitations 
on the size of punitive damage awards.
62
  The Haslips had purchased bundled 
health and life insurance through Pacific Mutual, under which Pacific Mutual 
would provide the life insurance coverage and Union would provide the 
health insurance.
63
  The Haslips were to send one check for both insurance 
payments to Pacific Mutual, who was to send Union’s share of the insurance 
premiums on to Union’s office.
64
  However, the Haslips’ Pacific Mutual in-
surance agent misappropriated most of their payments for himself and did not 
forward their premiums on to Union, so the Haslips’ health insurance cover-
  
 53. Id. at 1026-27. 
 54. Id. at 1025. 
 55. Id. at 1027. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1029. 
 58. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574, 580, 583 (1996). 
 59. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029, 1030-31. 
 60. Id. at 1031. 
 61. See infra Part V.C. 
 62. 499 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1991). 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Id. at 5. 
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age lapsed.
65
  Unsurprisingly, the agent did not inform the Haslips of the 




The Supreme Court upheld the jury’s punitive damages award of   
“more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, [and] more than 
200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of respondent Haslip” given the      
“objective criteria” of the case, but did note that the award “may be close to 
the line” of constitutional excessiveness.
67
  The Court held that giving a judge 
or jury unlimited discretion to determine the amount of punitive damages 
could create “extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.”
68
  It 
went on to say that this danger could be mitigated by “reasonableness and 
adequate guidance from the court,” but did not provide such guidance.
69
  In 
her dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the majority had not gone far 
enough in limiting punitive damages,
70
 given the recent “explosion in the 
frequency and size of punitive damages awards”
71
 where “[m]edians as well 
as averages [were] skyrocketing.”
72
 
Two years later, another excessive punitive damages case came before 
the Supreme Court in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
73
  
In that case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $19,000 in compensatory damages 
for slander of title and $10 million in punitive damages.
74
  The Court rejected 
both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s proposed tests for the validity of puni-
tive damages
75
 and declined to make any bright line rule or test regarding 
what would be considered an unconstitutionally large punitive damages 
award.
76
  The Court explicitly rejected considering the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages, holding that “we do not consider the dramatic dispar-
ity between the actual damages and the punitive award controlling in a case 
of this character.”
77
  In affirming the 524:1 ratio, the Court held that the 




 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 23. 
 68. Id. at 18. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 61. 
 72. Id. at 62. 
 73. 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 456. 
 76. Id. at 458. 
 77. Id. at 462. 
 78. Id. 
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This seeming reversal from Haslip, which had suggested that any ratio 
higher than 4:1 approached the limits of due process,
79
 was justified by       
the Court in a later case on the rationale that the TXO court had affirmed     
the award on the basis of “the harm to the victim that would have ensued       




Just three years later, however, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 
the Court did exactly what it had declined to do in Haslip and TXO: it created 
a test to measure the validity of punitive damages.
81
  In this landmark       
case, Gore sued the manufacturer of his “new” BMW car, which he discov-
ered had sustained minor damage, been repainted, and passed off as new in 
accordance with BMW’s national policy.
82
  The jury awarded compensatory 
damages of $4,000, but also awarded him $4 million in punitive damages.
83
  
The Alabama Supreme Court reduced this amount to $2 million (a 1000:1 




After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court for the first time struck 
down a jury award as excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause.
85
  
It held that in order to be in line with the Constitution, a punitive award    
must comport with a test (the Gore Test): (1) the award must relate to the 
conduct occurring within the state;
86
 (2) the defendant must receive fair no-
tice of the conduct that will subject him to punishment; and (3) the defendant 
must have fair notice of the severity of the penalty that the state may im-
pose.
87
  It produced three important “Guideposts” (the Gore Guideposts) for 
lower courts to follow in regards to the third element: (1) the “degree of rep-
rehensibility” of the defendants’ actions; (2) the ratio between compensatory 
and punitive damages; and (3) the difference between the given punitive 
damage award and the criminal and civil penalties for similar conduct.
88
  The 





 79. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).  It must be noted 
that Haslip focused on what procedures must be followed by a jury when determining 
punitive damages and not so much on setting forth a quantitative ratio for determining 
those damages.  Id. at 18.  The “test” set forth by Haslip may therefore be better char-
acterized as persuasive dicta than substantive law. 
 80. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 574-75. 
 82. Id. at 563-64. 
 83. Id. at 565. 
 84. Id. at 567. 
 85. Id. at 574-75. 
 86. Id. at 572. 
 87. Id. at 574. 
 88. Id. at 574-75. 
 89. Id. at 575. 
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When considering the first Guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility, the 
Court approved consideration of several factors (the Gore Factors), including: 
if the harm was physical or economic; whether the conduct was in reckless 
disregard for the health and safety of others; whether it was intentional, mali-
cious, or deceitful; whether the target of the conduct was in a vulnerable posi-
tion; and whether the defendant repeatedly engaged in the conduct even 
knowing that it was harmful.
90
   
When considering the second Gore Factor, the ratio, the Court again 
“rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathe-
matical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the 
punitive award.”
91
  The Court went on to say that low compensatory awards 
may justify a higher ratio, and higher awards may support a lower ratio.
92
  It 
concluded that “[i]n most cases, the ratio will be within a constitutionally 
acceptable range, and remittitur will not be justified . . . .”
93
  Thus, the Court 
did not provide even a suggestion of an appropriate ratio, merely noting that 
when the punitive damage award was so great as to be “breathtaking” it 
“must surely ‘raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.’”
94
   
The dissenting opinions, one written by Justice Antonin Scalia and 
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, and one written by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, vehemently opposed the majority’s new test.
95
  Scalia noted that 
the determination of punitive damages is not an analytical decision, since it 
measures the “community’s sense of indignation or outrage” and what pun-
ishment the defendant deserves, and it is therefore best left to the jury, “the 
voice of the community,” to decide.
96
  He also claimed that the test set forth 
by the majority “does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal 
analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award of 
punitive damages was not ‘fair.’”
97
  Scalia critically remarked, “In truth, the 
‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all.”
98
  
Ginsburg voiced a similar opinion, noting that the majority’s test was so 
vague it ultimately only amounted to a “raised eyebrow” test.
99
 
The last punitive damages case of note decided by the Supreme Court 
was State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell in 2003.
100
  In 
this case, the Campbells attempted to pass six cars at once on a two-lane 
  
 90. Id. at 576. 
 91. Id. at 582 (emphasis in original). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 583. 
 94. Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 95. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 606. 
 98. Id. at 605. 
 99. Id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 100. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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highway, resulting in a deadly car accident.
101
  The Campbells, who were 
uninjured, were eventually found to be 100% at fault.
102
  Even though State 
Farm’s investigators knew Mr. Campbell was likely at fault, it decided to 
contest the claim and declined a settlement offer from both other parties for 
$50,000, the policy limit.
103
 Moreover, it assured the Campbells that they 
were safe from liability and that they did not need to procure separate coun-
sel.
104
  State Farm agents altered their records to make the Campbells seem 
less culpable.
105
  When the Campbells were found to be liable for nearly 
$186,000 in damages in the ensuing jury trial, the insurance company refused 
to pay the extra and told the Campbells to put a for sale sign on their house.
106
  
The Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith.
107
  
The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in actual damages and 
$145 million dollars in punitive damages.
108
  The district court remitted the 
actual damages to $1 million, but upheld the punitive award (a 145:1 ratio).
109
   
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the case was “neither close nor 
difficult,” and held that the punitive damages award was grossly excessive 
and in violation of the Due Process Clause.
110
  The Court held that “in prac-
tice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compen-
satory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”
111
  The 
Court quoted the 4:1 ratio from Haslip, holding that this ratio is “instructive” 
but not “binding.”
112
  It went on to note that “[w]hen compensatory damages 
are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory dam-
ages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”
113
  The 
Court found that the $1 million dollars of compensatory damages were sub-




 101. Id. at 412-13. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 413. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 419. 
 106. Id. at 413. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 415. 
 109. Id. at 415-16. 
 110. Id. at 418. 
 111. Id. at 425. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court gave further weight to this 1:1 
ratio in the maritime case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, holding that the 5:1 puni-
tive damages levied against Exxon for the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska were ex-
cessive and a 1:1 ratio was appropriate.  554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008). 
 114. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429. 
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B. Eighth Circuit Jurisprudence 
The Eighth Circuit has dealt with nine cases involving significant puni-
tive damages awards similar to those in Ondrisek.
115
  In Williams v. ConAgra 
Poultry Co. an employee sued his company for hostile work environment and 
wrongful termination based upon disparate treatment
116
 and numerous in-




  This   
harassment included racist remarks and “threatening actions, such as nooses 
left at the work stations of black employees, a black doll hung by a noose in 
the factory, and invitations extended to black employees to attend Ku Klux 
Klan (KKK) hunting parties at which they would be the hunted.”
118
  None of 
the actions were directed at the plaintiff personally.
119
  The Eighth Circuit 
noted that it was unclear how many of these incidents actually affected the 
Plaintiff; who seemed to have wholesale adopted the allegations of another 
employee in an earlier case.
120
  The jury awarded him approximately $2 mil-
lion in compensatory damages and $12 million in punitive damages.
121
  The 
court remitted the damages to $600,000 each,
122
 in part because the award 
was far in excess of what an analogous case under Title VII would allow 
($30,000)
123
 and because the ratio exceeded the level that the Supreme Court 
suggested was constitutional.
124
  Notably, the court held that the $600,000 
award here was “a lot of money,” enough to fall into the 1:1 ratio for substan-
tial awards suggested in State Farm.
125
  The court did not examine the repre-
hensibility of the employer’s conduct under the Gore Factors, simply noting 




Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C. involved a malpractice action 
against a nursing home after nurses carelessly and fraudulently mischarted an 
elderly patient’s condition and failed to treat her or contact the physician, 
even after the patient complained and asked several times for the doctor.
127
  
The decedent died in the hospital of a perforated bowel after several days of 
constipation; the doctor testified that she appeared to be pregnant due to the 
  
 115. This Note was researched and written in November, 2012, and has not been 
updated for new Eighth Circuit cases meeting this criteria since that time. 
 116. 378 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 117. Id. at 796. 
 118. Id. at 793. 
 119. Id. at 794. 
 120. Id. at 797-98. 
 121. Id. at 793. 
 122. Id. at 799. 
 123. Id. at 798. 
 124. Id. at 796. 
 125. Id. at 799. 
 126. Id.  
 127. 377 F.3d 827, 830-31 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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amount of free stool in her abdomen.
128
  The jury awarded the patient’s estate 
$500,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages, 
which was more than eight times the company’s net worth.
129
  In contrast to 
Williams, the court fully detailed the Gore Guideposts, finding the degree of 
reprehensibility to be substantial,
130
 the $500,000 of compensatory damages 
to be likewise substantial,
131
 and the legal penalties to be nowhere near the 
amount necessary to warrant such a high award.
132
  The court concluded that 
the 4:1 ratio suggested in Haslip was appropriate and remitted the punitive 
damages award to $2 million.
133
 
Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Industries, Inc. arose from a contract 
dispute wherein a manufacturer unlawfully terminated Diesel Machinery’s 
franchise agreement with them.
134
  Eight months into the contract the      
manufacturer unilaterally terminated the agreement because it had acquired 
another product line and planned to use that line’s pre-existing dealer network 
to sell its products.
135
  The manufacturer had terminated several other dealer-
ship agreements across the country.
136
  The jury awarded the plaintiff      
company $665,000 in actual damages and $4.3 million in punitive damages, 
which the district court remitted to $2.66 million.
137
  On appeal, the court    
set forth the Gore factors and determined that the last two, repetitive conduct 
and deliberate intent,
138
 were present, and that the manufacturer’s conduct 
was “sufficiently reprehensible to justify the punitive damage award [of 
4:1].”
139
  It also rejected the contention that the award was substantial enough 
to justify a 1:1 ratio, relying on the 4:1 ratio and $500,000 compensatory 
award in Stodsgill.
140
  Finally, it noted that while the criminal penalties were 
minimal, the civil penalties “could be substantial.”
141




In JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, a manufacturer of heavy construc-
tion equipment and a bank were both creditors of Machinery, Inc., who      
had bought construction equipment from JCB on credit and taken out a     
  
 128. Id. at 830. 
 129. Id. at 829. 
 130. Id. at 832. 
 131. Id. at 833. 
 132. Id. at 834. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 418 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 135. Id. at 827-28. 
 136. Id. at 828. 
 137. Id. at 826. 
 138. Id. at 839. 
 139. Id. at 840. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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loan from the bank.
143
  Machinery, Inc. filed for bankruptcy and JCB took 
back its equipment.
144
  The bank, however, unlawfully entered onto JCB’s 
property, repossessed the equipment without notice, and auctioned it off   
despite JCB’s protests.
145
  The jury found for JCB on the conversion claim 
(awarding $1,446,500 in compensatory and $1,150,000 in punitive damages) 
and on the trespass claim (awarding $1 in nominal damages and a $1,087,500 
punitive damages award).
146
  The court determined that the reprehensibility  
of the bank’s conduct in this case was comparable to that of the defendant    
in Diesel Machinery.
147
  On the conversion claim the court held that, given 
that the amount of compensatory damages was substantial, a 1:1 ratio        
was warranted.
148
  On the trespass claim the court reduced the award by one 




Moore v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. was another bad faith 
insurance claim, wherein the plaintiff’s newly purchased duplex was de-
stroyed by a fire and the insurance company refused to pay on the unsubstan-
tiated  theory that Moore had intentionally set fire to the duplex.
150
  The jury 
returned an award of approximately $1.15 million in actual damages and 
$1.15 million in punitive damages.
151
  The court concluded that the harm to 
Mr. Moore was more than simple economic harm since he suffered reputa-
tional harm, emotional distress, and economic harm from the criminal charges 
filed against him when he was accused of arson.
152
  Moreover, there was evi-
dence that the insurance company’s treatment of the Moore claim “was typi-
cal of how it handled similar claims.”
153
  The civil penalties for the insurance 
company’s actions could have included the loss of their license in the forum 
state, which the judge noted “might well prove much more costly than a puni-
tive damages award” of $1.15 million.
154
  The court ultimately concluded that 
the “relevant ratio here is one to one and well within the acceptable range.”
155
  
In White v. McKinley, White sued his ex-wife, Tina, and a police officer 
for various torts and violations of his constitutional rights after Tina falsely 
accused him of molesting her daughter.
156
  White married Tina, who had two 
  
 143. 539 F.3d 862, 867 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 144. Id. at 868. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 869. 
 147. Id. at 875. 
 148. Id. at 876. 
 149. Id. at 877. 
 150. 576 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 790. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 791. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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children from a previous marriage.
157
  The biological father agreed to termi-
nate his parental rights so that White could adopt the children, but only after 
Tina threatened to charge the biological father with child molestation.
158
  
When her subsequent marriage to White deteriorated, Tina made a false po-
lice report about White shoving her, and when the police came to talk to her 
about the report she alleged that White had been molesting her daughter for 
years.
159
  The officer investigating the charges began a sexual relationship 
with Tina and throughout the investigation made several crucial errors and 
omissions that would likely have exonerated White.
160
  In an effort to avoid 
wrongful incarceration, White fled the country, but was captured and re-
turned.
161
  In his suit against Tina and the officer, the jury found in favor of 
White and awarded $14 million dollars in actual damages and $1 million in 
punitive damages against both Tina and the officer.
162
  Only the officer chal-
lenged the award as excessive.
163
  The court did not quantify the reprehensi-
bility of the officer’s conduct or consider comparable civil or criminal pun-
ishments, but when affirming simply noted that the punitive damages award 
was only 7% of the actual damages award.
164
  
In Ondrisek, the Eighth Circuit gave great consideration to three previ-
ous cases it had decided.
165
 The first case was Eden Electrical, Ltd. v. Amana 
Co., in which Amana, a manufacturing company, decided to induce a “suck-
er” distributing company (Eden Electrical) to enter into an exclusive dealer-
ship agreement it had no intention of honoring.
166
  In this agreement, Amana 
would offload outdated “junk” inventory onto the distributor in exchange for 
$2.4 million dollars.
167
  As soon as Eden Electrical paid them the money, 
Amana terminated the distributorship, ceased communications, and appointed 
another company to be its real distributor.
168
  Amana’s agents had expressed a 
desire to “f***” and “kill” Eden Electrical after taking its money in the sham 
dealership plot.
169
   Throughout the discovery and trial process Amana and its 
executives further lied and perjured themselves in an effort to cover up their 
intentional wrongdoing.
170
  The jury awarded $2.1 million dollars in compen-
satory damages and $18 million dollars in punitive damages; the trial judge 
  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 529. 
 160. Id. at 529-30. 
 161. Id. at 530. 
 162. Id. at 531. 
 163. Id. at 538. 
 164. Id. at 538-39. 
 165. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 166. 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961-62 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 963. 
 169. Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 170. Eden Elec., 258 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64. 
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remitted the punitive damages award to $10 million dollars.
171
  On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the 4.8:1 ratio
172
 on the grounds that Defendant’s 
conduct was “extraordinarily reprehensible.”
173
 
The second case the Eighth Circuit emphasized, Consenco Finance  
Servicing Corp. v. North American Mortgage Co., involved mortgage com-
panies competing in the subprime lending market.
174
  North American   
Mortgage (NAM) solicited several of Consenco’s employees to leave 
Consenco for NAM and encouraged those employees to bring with them 
some of Consenco’s information on which customers to target and said cus-
tomers’ private financial information.
175
  At trial, the jury found for Consenco 
on its claims and awarded it $3.5 million in actual damages and $18 million 
in punitive damages (a 5.1:1 ratio).
176
  The district court declined to remit the 
punitive damages award.
177
 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that NAM’s 
conduct was “sufficiently reprehensible” to support punitive damages, but 
given “the nature of [NAM’s] conduct and the harm suffered solely by 
Consenco,” it determined that the award was excessive and remitted it to $7 
million (a 2:1 ratio). 
178
  
The third case was Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., in 
which the widower of a lifelong smoker sued the makers of Pall Mall ciga-
rettes.
179
  At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff on his defective design claim 
and awarded him a little over $4 million in compensatory damages and $15 
million in punitive damages (a 3.5:1 ratio).
180
  The Eighth Circuit held that 
Defendant’s conduct was “highly reprehensible,” in that: 
Pall Mall cigarettes were extremely carcinogenic and extremely addic-
tive – substantially more so than other types of cigarettes; the sale of 
this defective product occurred repeatedly over the course of many 
years despite American Tobacco’s knowledge that the product was 
dangerous to the user’s health; and American Tobacco actively misled 
consumers about the health risks associated with smoking.  Moreover, 
the reprehensible conduct was shown to relate directly to the harm suf-





 171. Eden Elec., 370 F.3d at 826. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 829. 
 174. 381 F.3d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 175. Id. at 815. 
 176. Id. at 814. 
 177. Id. at 818. 
 178. Id. at 825. 
 179. 394 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 602-03. 
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Although the court noted that “the degree of reprehensibility is the ‘most 
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award,’”
182
 
the court remitted the damages down to $5 million, a 1.2:1 ratio, on the 
ground that the second Gore Guidepost calls for a smaller ratio when the 
compensatory award is already high.
183
  The court quoted State Farm: “When 
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal 




These nine cases form the basis of Eighth Circuit precedence regarding 
excessive punitive damages litigation and play an important part in evaluating 
the outcome of Ondrisek v. Hoffman.  
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
On appeal before the Eighth Circuit, Alamo first argued that the large 
punitive damages award should be eliminated altogether because it was not 
designed to deter him, but to punish him for his “unorthodox religious be-
liefs.”
 185
  In support, he asserted that since he was incarcerated serving a 175 
year sentence, and therefore could not repeat his conduct, there was no deter-
rence value.
186
  The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the 
two recognized policy objectives for punitive damage awards, to punish the 
wrongdoer and deter similar wrongful conduct in others,
187
 clearly justified a 
punitive damages award in this situation.
188
  
The court considered Alamo’s second argument, that the excessive 
amount of the award violated due process and Arkansas law, at length.
189
  
Since Arkansas has adopted the federal substantive due process analysis for 
excessive punitive damages awards, the court analyzed the federal and state 
questions together by applying the Gore Test and Guideposts, noting that the 
first Guidepost, reprehensibility, was the most important factor of the three.
190
  
The court then laid out the specific factors it could consider when determin-
ing reprehensibility:  
[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; [2] the tor-
tious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the 
health or safety of others; [3] the target of the conduct had financial 
  
 182. Id. at 602. 
 183. Id. at 603. 
 184. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,     
425 (2003)). 
 185. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1027 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008)). 
 188. Id. at 1028. 
 189. Id. at 1028-31. 
 190. Id. at 1028. 
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vulnerability; [4] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an iso-
lated incident; and [5] the harm was the result of intentional malice, 
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
191
 
In applying the Gore Factors to the instant case, the court determined 
that the harm caused was physical in nature, “evidenced a reckless disregard 
for the health and safety” of the Plaintiffs, and was particularly reprehensible 
in that Alamo was “in a position of trust as a religious leader, yet he continu-
ally abused that power to subject children to substantial physical and emo-
tional abuse.”
192
  Moreover, this was not the first time Alamo had been found 
liable for battering children, and in Miller, the lesser damages imposed
193
 had 
not deterred him from repeating his conduct, so greater damages were appro-
priate.
194
  The court thus concluded Alamo’s actions were “exceptionally 
reprehensible, justifying significant punitive damages.”
195
 
As to the second factor, the court agreed that the 10:1 ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages was unconstitutionally excessive, despite 
the reprehensibility of Alamo’s actions.
196
  The court set forth the prevailing 
standards on damage award ratios from State Farm, Gore, and Haslip, noting 
that when “compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps 
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due 
process guarantee” and that “an award of more than four times the amount of 
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional improprie-
ty.”
197
  Given that the Supreme Court of the United States had already deter-
mined that a $1 million compensatory award was substantial, the $3 million 
compensatory award in Ondrisek undoubtedly also qualified as substantial.
198
 
The court then recounted three instances in which it had reviewed puni-
tive damages cases with compensatory damages greater than $1 million and a 
ratio of greater than 1:1.
199
  After reviewing the damage ratios in Eden Elec-
trical, Consenco, and Boerner, the Ondrisek court then turned to the third 
Guidepost in Gore and compared punitive damages in similar civil cases.  
  
 191. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,     
419 (2003)). 
 192. Id. at 1029. 
 193. In the previous case, one boy received $1,000 in compensatory damages and 
$5,000 in punitive damages, the second received $50,000 in compensatory damages 
and $500,000 in punitive damages (a 5:1 and 10:1 ratio respectively).  Miller v. Tony 
& Susan Alamo Found., 748 F. Supp. 695, 698-99 (W.D. Ark. 1990).  
 194. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1030. 
 197. Id. at 1029 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 425 (2003)). 
 198. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,        
426 (2003)). 
 199. Id. at 1029-30. 
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The court considered both predecessors of the instant case.  In Miller, the 
damages were 10:1, but the court noted that the compensatory damages in 
Miller were significantly smaller ($50,000) and that the case was not ap-
pealed.
200




The court then compared the instant case to Eden Electrical, Consenco, 
and Boerner.  The court also attached an appendix containing a chart detail-
ing all Eighth Circuit Cases appealed on the basis of excessive punitive dam-
age awards since Gore.
202
  It held that Alamo’s conduct was more reprehen-
sible than in Consenco or Boerner, and concluded that “a reduction to 2:1 or 
1:1 was not required.”
203
  And, although Alamo’s actions were no less repre-
hensible than those of the defendant in Eden Electrical, the greater compensa-






Ondrisek v. Hoffman illuminates the difficulties with applying the Gore 
Guideposts and other Supreme Court precedent.  Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding punitive damages has varied, with the general trend indicat-
ing that high ratio punitive damages awards are becoming a thing of the 
past.
205
  In 1991, the Haslip Court determined that awards in excess of 4:1 
may be near the constitutional limit.
206
  In 1993, the Court in TXO rejected 
the use of ratios in the given decision and affirmed a 524:1 award.
207
  In 
1996, the Gore Court again reversed course, citing with approval Haslip’s 4:1 
ratio and reinterpreting the ratio in TXO to be “not more than 10 to 1” when 
considering the potential harm the plaintiff could have suffered.
208
  In State 
Farm in 2003 the Court agreed with the 4:1 ratio in Haslip, as well as the 
10:1 maximum ratio in TXO, but suggested that a 1:1 ratio is appropriate for 
  
 200. Id. at 1030. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 1031 n.4. 
 203. Id. at 1030. 
 204. Id. at 1030-31. 
 205. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 
(2003) (reversing 145:1 ratio); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 560 
(1996) (reversing 500:1 ratio); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 
462 (1993) (affirming 524:1 ratio); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 
(1991) (affirming 4:1 ratio).  
 206. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23. 
 207. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462. 
 208. Gore, 517 U.S. at 581. 
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high compensatory damages cases.
209
  In a relatively short span of time the 
Court has greatly restrained the ability of juries to impose outlier verdicts 
where punitive damages are excessively large.  
The Eighth Circuit has had the difficult task of applying these amor-
phous standards to cases in its own jurisdiction, with mixed success.
210
  Since 
Gore, the Eighth Circuit has entertained 27 cases that disputed whether puni-
tive damage awards were excessive,
211
 which ultimately resulted in ratios as 
high as 100:1
212
 and punitive damages as much as $18 million.
213
 There are 
two particular areas of concern which this subsection addresses: first, the 
depth of analysis with which the Gore Guideposts are applied to cases, and 
second, the degree to which the factors are useful at all in determining the 
constitutionality of punitive damages. 
In an attempt to weigh the appropriateness of the punitive damages 
award in Ondrisek with the rest of Eighth Circuit punitive damages cases, I 
constructed two charts for comparison purposes, much like the Eighth Circuit 
did in its opinion in Ondrisek.  I selected the cases that were handed down in 
2004 or later, after State Farm was decided, and in which the amount of puni-
tive damages was held to be substantial (i.e., $500,000 and over).
214
  This 
produced nine cases for comparison. 
I then charted these nine cases, along with Ondrisek, based on the Gore 
Guideposts: the compensatory damages awarded, the final ratio, the reprehen-
sibility of the conduct based on the Gore Factors, and the comparable civil 
and criminal punishments.
 215
  The Supreme Court held in State Farm that 
“[t]he existence of any one of [the Gore] factors weighing in favor of a plain-
tiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the ab-
sence of all of them renders any award suspect.”
216
  Thus, I included the 
number of Gore Factors that were present in each case.  As further means of 
measuring reprehensibility, I included how many of these factors were partic-
ularly compelling, based upon both my own judgment and the weight the 
court seemed to give to that factor, which I discuss in greater detail in the 
text.  I judged the severity of the comparable civil and criminal punishments 
on a high/low scale based on whether the conduct amounted to a felony in 
  
 209. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 210. See generally Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1031 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(providing an appendix that lists Eighth Circuit cases addressing the constitutionality 
of punitive damages). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See United States v. Big D Enters., Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 933 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 213. See Consenco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 825 
(8th Cir. 2004). 
 214. See, e.g., Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 833 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that a punitive damages award of $5,000,000 was “conscience-
shocking” and violated due process). 
 215. See infra Appendix A. 
 216. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
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criminal cases or fines and liability in excess of $500,000 in similar civil cas-
es. For example, a case that could have been a felony would be rated high, 
whereas a civil case with a potential of $150,000 worth of compensatory 
damages would be rated low.  
Of course, the chart should not be considered authoritative.  The Gore 
Guideposts are, after all, merely guidance in determining when a punitive 
award violates due process; it is not a mechanistic test.  The chart is to be 
used for only comparison purposes to find general trends in the application of 
the Gore Guideposts, the same way the Eighth Circuit attached a similar chart 
in the appendix to its opinion. 
B. Comparison  
Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases  
 
















$2,100,000 4.8:1 1 1 High 
Ondrisek 
Abuse in Cult 








$665,000 4:1 2 0 High 
Consenco 
Subprime Mortgages 
$3,500,000  2:1 2 1 High 
Boerner 
Death of Smoker 
















$14,000,000  0.07:1 4 2 High 
  
 217. These compensatory damages amounts have been taken from the chart in 
Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1031 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 218. See infra Appendix A. 
 219. See infra Appendix A. 
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The first case, Consenco, involved institution-wide wrongdoing by a 
subprime mortgage lending institution that was stealing a competitor’s infor-
mation on customers.
220
  When reviewing the Gore Factors in this case, only 
two factors are present, and only one of them was particularly compelling. It 
is clear that the victim mortgage company was neither particularly vulnerable 
nor physically harmed by the aggressor mortgage company’s actions.  While 
the aggressor company did encourage their new hires to bring over their com-
petitor’s information with them,
221
 evidencing intentionality, it was not par-
ticularly malicious in nature, simply a dubious business practice to get ahead 
in the market.  The only truly compelling factor in this case was that this “en-
couragement” to bring over their competitor’s information was a company-
wide occurrence repeated many times.
222
 
Boerner was a typical tobacco tort suit from 2005.
223
  The tobacco com-
pany used trickery and evidenced a casual disregard for their consumers’ 
health and safety by intentionally misleading them about the safety of Pall 
Mall cigarettes.
224
  Unsurprisingly, the use of the highly carcinogenic ciga-
rettes resulted in Mrs. Boerner’s slow death from lung cancer.
225
  On the oth-
er hand, Mrs. Boerner was an adult fully capable of reading the Surgeon Gen-
eral’s warnings about the effect of cigarettes, which were published as early 
as 1965.
226
  Since she continued to smoke for a good fifteen years after the 
warnings began being published,
227
 there was clearly some element of com-
parative fault in this case.  Additionally, the tobacco company did not have 
any malicious intent to inflict lung cancer and death upon Mrs. Boerner.
228
  
Finally, the tobacco company’s actions were only indirectly responsible for 
Mrs. Boerner’s death.  The only factor that was particularly compelling in this 
case was how the tobacco company’s actions affected many different custom-
ers over a period of many years. 
At first blush, Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co. appears to be an im-
mensely compelling case for punitive damages: the white employees acted 
outrageously in harassing the black employees.
229
  An examination of the 
Gore Test and Gore Factors, however, reveals a more modest case overall.  
  
 220. Consenco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 815 (8th 
Cir. 2004).  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 817. 
 223. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 224. Id. at 602-03. 
 225. Id. at 598. 
 226. See Cent. for Disease Control, History of the Surgeon General’s Reports on 
Smoking and Health, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/his-
tory/ (last updated July 6, 2009). 
 227. Boerner, 394 F.3d at 598. 
 228. Id. at 603. 
 229. 378 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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The employer’s agents showed a severe disregard for the black employee’s 
mental health and safety by creating an intimidating environment where vio-
lence seemed imminent.
230
  The actions of the employer’s agents were clearly 
malicious and intentional in nature, not mere negligence.  The black employ-
ees were relatively vulnerable, given that they were subordinates whose live-
lihoods depended upon their jobs.  On the other hand, however, there was no 
physical harm done to the plaintiff, or any other black employee.  Also, as the 
Eighth Circuit noted, it was unclear how many of the prior incidents actually 
affected the Plaintiff; he seemed to have just copied the allegations of another 
employee in an earlier case.
231
  All told, there were three Gore Factors pre-
sent, but only two – intentional or malicious conduct and repetitive occur-
rences – were truly compelling.
232
  
Stodsgill, the nursing home case,
233
 is even less compelling, as far as  
excessive punitive damages cases go.  The most persuasive factor in this case 
was the amount of physical harm the decedent underwent, up to and including 
her wrongful death.
234
  Also compelling was the decedent’s vulnerability.  
She was a woman confined to a wheelchair in a nursing home.
235
  Her degree 
of comprehension and ability to communicate, which would have affected  
the degree of her vulnerability, were unclear.  The nurses’ disregard for her 
health and safety by improper charting and failure to bring the doctor       
were also noteworthy.
236
  What really diminished the overall weight of       
this case was the lack of intent displayed by the nurses.  This was a case       
of negligence, not malice.
237
  The point of punitive damages is to punish the 
defendant for his conduct, and negligent conduct is less worthy of punishment 
than deliberate, unapologetic conduct like that of Alamo.
238
  To be sure,     
this was a terrible event worthy of significant compensatory damages, but     
it ultimately amounted to a run-of-the-mill medical malpractice claim. To 
award this case a 4:1 punitive damages ratio was a bit excessive when com-
pared to the other cases.
239
 
Diesel Machinery involved a cancelled dealership contract because the 
manufacturer wanted to sell its product line in its own stores,
240
 and it was  
  
 230. Id. at 797-98.  
 231. Id. at 793-94. 
 232. See infra Appendix A. 
 233. Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 234. See id. at 830. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 832.  
 237. Id. 
 238. See, e.g., id. at 829-30 (noting that “an award of punitive damages requires 
proof that the defendant acted wantonly in causing the injury or with such a conscious 
indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred”). 
 239. Id. at 834. 
 240. Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 826-28 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
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not a particularly compelling case.  There was no physical harm done to the 
plaintiff company; the harm was only a lost dealership contract.
241
  The man-
ufacturer did not act in disregard for the dealer’s health and safety.
242
         
The “victim” company was a business that sought legal representation,
243
 
which did not make them particularly vulnerable.  Although the manufacturer 
terminated several contracts around the country,
244
 the decision cannot be 
characterized as malicious; indeed, it appeared to have been strictly a busi-
ness decision (albeit a poor one). However, it was done intentionally, without 
regard for the law or consideration of the dealers.
245
  This case has only two 
Gore Factors present, the repetitiveness of the conduct and intentional trick-




JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank was a case involving a debtor third 
party whose creditor bank illegally repossessed and sold the debtor’s equip-
ment that was stored on a another creditor’s property.
247
  This case is similar 
to Diesel Machinery in several ways: there was no physical harm inflicted, 
the parties were both companies that make multimillion dollar business 
deals,
248
 and there was little disregard for the company’s health or safety.  
Unlike Diesel Machinery, the conduct was intentional and can be aptly char-
acterized as “trickery,” but evidence indicated that this scheme was only per-
petrated once.  All told, only one Gore Factor was present, and it was not 
very persuasive.  
Moore, the alleged arson and bad faith insurance case,
249
 was a       
moderately compelling case.  Moore was not particularly vulnerable as an 
average adult.  However, although Moore was not physically assaulted, the 
trial court aptly pointed out that he suffered serious harm by being falsely 
accused of arson.
250
  The insurance company evidenced a disregard for 
Moore’s mental health and safety because it knew or should have known that 
such a severe false accusation would inflict emotional distress, and it similar-
ly disregarded any threats to his physical health and safety that may have 
resulted from his incarceration.
251
  The insurance carrier’s decision to accuse 
Moore of arson was a fairly routine business practice and seemed more eco-
nomically motivated than by personal malice.
252
  Three of the Gore Factors 
  
 241. Id. at 829. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 828-29. 
 245. Id. at 840. 
 246. Id. at 840. 
 247. 539 F.3d 862, 867 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 248. Id. at 867-68.  
 249. Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 250. Id. at 790.  
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
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were present, and two of them – harm inflicted and repetitiveness – were 
fairly compelling here.  
The most compelling punitive damages case yet has been White, in 
which Plaintiff was falsely accused of molesting his stepdaughter.
253
  Like in 
Moore, Plaintiff suffered severe harm stemming from false accusations that 
were more than purely economic in nature.
254
  Defendants also displayed a 
disregard for White’s economic health by effectively ruining his life and his 
physical health and safety,
255
 since pedophiles tend to be ostracized in prison.  
While Plaintiff was not particularly vulnerable, given his status as a capable 
adult, his wife’s conduct was shockingly malicious and the police officer’s 
manipulation of the case can be characterized as trickery.  Also, this was not 
his wife’s first time threatening to accuse a husband of molesting her daugh-
ter, indicating repeated conduct on her part.
256
  Four of the five Gore Factors 
were present, and the harm White suffered and the malice displayed by the 
defendants were particularly compelling.  
1. Reprehensibility: Eden Electrical Versus Ondrisek 
According to the Gore Guideposts, one must first consider the reprehen-
sibility of Alamo’s conduct.
257
  Ondrisek sets an unprecedented high in the 
category of reprehensibility.  It is the only Eighth Circuit case in the decade 




The Gore Factors ask whether the harm was physical or economic, 
whether the conduct was in reckless disregard for the health and safety of 
others, whether it was intentional, malicious, or deceitful, whether the target 
of the conduct was in a vulnerable position, and whether the defendant re-
peatedly engaged in the conduct even knowing that it was harmful.
259
  As for 
physical harm, the boys were subject to severe mental and physical abuse.
260
  
There was also an element of economic harm because they performed exten-
sive work for the compound without pay starting at a very young age.
261
  This 
harm was done in blatant disregard for the mental and physical safety of the 
boys, since they both sustained permanent injuries and contemplated sui-
cide.
262
  As for the Plaintiffs’ vulnerability, it is clear that they were extreme-
  
 253. White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 254. Id. at 530. 
 255. Id. at 531. 
 256. Id. at 528. 
 257. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 258. See infra Appendix A. 
 259. Gore, 517 U.S. at 576. 
 260. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 261. Id. at 1023. 
 262. Id. at 1024. 
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ly vulnerable given their young age, isolated upbringing, and lack of parental 
protection.
263
  Moreover, Alamo was in a position of great power over them 
as the head of their religious order and entire community.
264
  As for the isola-
tion or repetitiveness of the defendant’s actions, it went on throughout the 
Plaintiffs’ childhoods.
265
  Moreover, Alamo was quite aware of the legal ef-
fect of his actions, given the previous lawsuit alleging the same conduct years 
earlier.
266
  The only thing that could have made Ondrisek even more compel-
ling under a Gore Factor analysis was direct evidence that Alamo tormented 
the Plaintiffs exclusively out of malice. While one may certainly infer that 
there was some degree of intentional malice present, there is not enough evi-
dence to make this factor as compelling as the other four.  
While the Gore Factors are not dispositive, they are fair indicators of 
reprehensibility. However, even common moral principles indicate that this 
situation is completely reprehensible. Because of the extreme reprehensibility 
evidenced by Alamo in this case, Ondrisek occupies a special place in Eighth 
Circuit punitive damages jurisprudence.  If Ondrisek tops the reprehensibility 
chart, then district courts would have a concrete high-water mark to compare 
the cases before them to.
267
  In essence, Ondrisek was an opportunity to pro-
vide clarity and consistency to lower courts and bring greater harmony to 
punitive damages decisions in the Eighth Circuit.  
This opportunity appears to have been a missed one, however.  The 
court notably skirted the opportunity to compare Alamo’s conduct to that of 
Amana in Eden Electrical, the court’s earlier high-water mark.
268
  The court 
wrote: “This panel does not suggest that Alamo’s actions are any less repre-
hensible than the defendant’s conduct in [Eden Electrical], but – given the 
larger compensatory damage award here – the punitive damages should not 
exceed a 4:1 ratio to maintain the notions of fundamental fairness and due 
process.”
269
  Despite having this elaborate test to measure the reprehensibility 
of defendants’ conduct and constructing a detailed chart for comparison pur-
poses, the Eighth Circuit refused to use these tools to draw conclusions, and 
instead jumped right to the issue of the ratio.  
However, it is easy enough to apply the Gore Test to the present case 
and reach the conclusion that the Eighth Circuit so notably refused to draw.  
The results of this application show that Ondrisek should have been the new 
high-water mark and would have necessitated a ratio the same or higher than 
Eden Electrical, thereby surpassing the 4:1 ratio set out in Haslip.
270
  The 
  
 263. Id. at 1023-24. 
 264. Id. at 1029. 
 265. Id. at 1023-24. 
 266. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. 
 267. See infra Appendix A. 
 268. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029-30. 
 269. Id. at 1030-31. 
 270. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991). 
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compensatory and punitive damages in the two cases are roughly comparable: 
$2.1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages 
in Eden Electrical,
271
 compared to $3 million in compensatory damages and 
$12 million in punitive damages in Ondrisek. 
272
   However, the reprehensi-




In Eden Electrical, both parties were multi-million-dollar companies as-
sisted by legal counsel.
274
  In Ondrisek, on the other hand, the victims were 
vulnerable boys taken advantage of by a religious leader.
275
  In Eden Electri-
cal, there was only evidence of one fraudulent scheme.
276
  In Ondrisek, the 
abuse went on for years,
277
 and Alamo had been sued before for precisely the 
same actions.
278
  In Eden Electrical, the victim company lost only money 
(albeit, a substantial amount of it).
279
  The Plaintiffs in Ondrisek, however, 
sustained economic as well as very severe physical damage.
280
  Seth Calagnia 
had to watch his father be beaten until his father cried and could not get up.
281
  
Both boys had to listen to Alamo tell them repeatedly that they were worth-
less and would go to hell.
282
   Further, both boys contemplated suicide based 
on the repeated physical and emotional abuse they suffered.
283
  The two cases 
simply do not compare. 
It is clear that the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions should have 
favored making Ondrisek the high-water mark over Eden.  Although the Su-
preme Court asserts that the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is the 
most important factor,
284
 the Ondrisek decision belies this claim since the 
defendant’s conduct in Ondrisek was far more reprehensible than Eden Elec-
trical, and yet the Plaintiff received a lower ratio in Ondrisek. 
It is Eden Electrical, then, which continues to present a problem when 
harmonizing punitive damages cases in the Eighth Circuit.  In Eden Electri-
cal, the damages awarded were slightly lower, the degree of reprehensibility 
  
 271. Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 272. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1027, 1031. 
 273. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024. 
 274. Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 959 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
 275. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029. 
 276. Eden Elec., 370 F.3d at 829. 
 277. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1023-24. 
 278. Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 748 F. Supp. 695, 699 (W.D.       
Ark. 1990). 
 279. See Eden Elec., 258 F. Supp. 2d at 963. 
 280. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1023-24. 
 281. Id. at 1024; Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *10-11. 
 282. Brief of Appellees, supra note 21, at *6. 
 283. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1024. 
 284. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (“Perhaps the most 
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree 
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”). 
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was by far lower, and yet the multiplier was .8 higher than in Ondrisek.
285
  
Indeed, it had a .8 ratio higher than any other case.
286
  Perhaps the easiest 
thing for the court to do would have been to overturn, expressly or implicitly, 
the award in Eden Electrical and present the 4:1 ratio to be the new maxi-
mum.  After all, the award was in 2004, a full nine years ago, the facts are 
easily distinguishable from Ondrisek, and Eden Electrical was one of the first 
cases applying the State Farm decision.  It would have been a simple matter 
to distinguish Eden Electrical on any of these grounds or not bring the case 
up at all.  However, the court selected Eden Electrical as one of the three 
cases to review as precedent and fully set forth the factual background of that 
case and its high-water 4.8:1 ratio.
287
  On the flimsy grounds of the small 
difference in compensatory damages between the two cases, the court effec-
tively held in Ondrisek that Eden Electrical would remain the Eighth Circuit 
high-water mark with a 4.8:1 ratio.
288
  
The concept of a ratio is inherently flawed.  Compensatory damages are 
different for a reason; they equal whatever amount it takes to make a plaintiff 
whole.
289
  Punitive damages, on the other hand, are meant to punish and   
deter similar future conduct.
290
  In Eden Electrical, the compensatory damag-
es were meant to make Eden Electrical’s business whole after Amana’s 
fraudulent scheme.
291
  In Ondrisek, the compensatory damages were to   
make the boys whole after all the terrible abuse they suffered while growing 
up.
292
 The Eighth Circuit used the small differences in the cases’ compensato-
ry damages to support a different, higher multiplier for Eden Electrical,   
even though in truth the amounts of the compensatory damages should be 
completely unrelated to the amount of punitive damages awarded, and the 
multipliers are just random numbers. The court’s justification for keeping 
Eden Electrical as its high-water mark is unpersuasive and at odds with the 
purpose of punitive damages. 
  
 285. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
(compare Ondrisek with Eden Electrical). 
 286. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 287. Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1029-30. 
 288. Id. at 1030-31. 
 289. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 
(2003) (“It should be presumed that a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries 
by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the de-
fendant’s culpability . . . is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further 
sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.”). 
 290. Id. at 416; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).  
 291. See Eden Elect., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 292. See Ondrisek, 698 F.3d at 1027. 
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2.     Under-Emphasis on Reprehensibility 
Also of note is the lack of emphasis placed by the court on the reprehen-
sibility of the defendant’s conduct and the court’s overemphasis on the ratio.  
For example, the chart in the Eighth Circuit’s appendix to Ondrisek focused 
on quantifying cases by the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages and 
made no mention of reprehensibility.
293
  While this omission could be at-
tributed to a number of things, the fact that they were compared by ratio and 
award size alone is still significant.  
In Ondrisek, the lesser emphasis on reprehensibility is particularly no-
ticeable.  As detailed above, the extreme reprehensibility of Alamo’s acts 
evidently did not warrant a ratio equal to or higher than Eden Electrical, even 
though Amana’s conduct was far less reprehensible than Alamo’s.  A similar 
effect is observed in the other cases. 
In Stogsdill, the gross negligence of the nurses hardly rises to the level 
of the deliberate conduct of Alamo, but it had the same overall ratio of 4:1.
294
  
The defendant’s conduct in Moore, the arson-insurance case, was quite repre-
hensible, as Mr. Moore had to deal with economic damages from the bad 
faith of the insurance company and criminal charges for arson.
295
  Yet, de-
spite the reprehensible conduct by the insurance company, Moore only re-
ceived a 1:1 ratio.
296
  In Williams, the conduct of Mr. Williams’ employer and 
employees was also quite reprehensible, given the extremely hostility and 
threatening behavior black employees received, but he, too, only received a 
1:1 ratio, despite this high degree of reprehensibility.
297
  
White is perhaps the only case wherein the actions of the defendants are 
close to those of Alamo in Ondrisek.  Maliciously and falsely accusing one’s 
husband of sexually molesting his adopted daughter, then covering up evi-
dence that would exonerate him,
298
 is utterly reprehensible by society’s 
standards.  The defendants’ actions resulted in White’s wrongful conviction 
as a pedophile and completely ruined his life.
299
  Despite this, White only 
received a 0.07:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, which is the 





 293. See id. at 1031 n.4. 
 294. See Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 831, 833 (8th 
Cir. 2004). 
 295. Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 296. Id. at 791. 
 297. Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 298. White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 528-29 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 299. See generally id. at 538. 
 300. Id. at 539.  It is important to remember that in White the jury chose to    
award only $1 million in punitive damages; this was not a case of remittance by the 
court.  Id. 
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The brief attention paid to the reprehensibility prong and the lack of 
weight it is given leads to the conclusion that reprehensibility is not, in fact, 
the most important factor in the Eighth Circuit.  Instead, the most important 
factor is the ratio.  
3. The Ratio Requirement Pile-Up 
The ratio requirement also merits consideration.  According to Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, a 1:1 ratio is recommended in cases in which the com-
pensatory damages awarded are “substantial.”
301
  In Ondrisek the Plaintiffs 
received $3 million in compensatory damages.
302
  This suggests that a 1:1 
ratio would certainly be appropriate here, although the presiding court has 
some latitude to adjust this number if there are exceptional circumstances.
303
  
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Eden Electrical,
304
 which had a high-
er ratio and lower reprehensibility,
305
 and this suggests that no more than 
three (if any) justices would have found that a 4.8:1 ratio does not violate due 
process, even in cases where the compensatory damages are substantial.  
Taken further, this indicates that the 1:1 ratio mentioned in State Farm
306
 is 
not a very rigid rule.  The 4:1 ratio in Ondrisek might not be as daring as the 
holding in State Farm suggests.  
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis slightly varies from the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.  First, it sets a lower threshold for a compensatory damages 
award to be considered “substantial”
307
 but routinely allows for ratios higher 
than 1:1 in such cases.
308
  Indeed, of ten cases with substantial damages, six 
have a ratio of more than 1:1 and four have a ratio of 4:1 or more.
309
  Howev-
er, the court seems to suggest in Ondrisek that it now considers a “substan-
tial” amount of compensatory damages to be $1 million, which is back in 
harmony with the Supreme Court but goes against earlier Eighth Circuit prec-
edent.
310
  The court stated, “In the years since Gore, this court has seldom 
reviewed the punitive damages with compensatory damages greater than $1 
million.”
311
  While this is certainly not dispositive, it is relevant that the 
Eighth Circuit chose to only compare Ondrisek to other cases above $1 mil-
  
 301. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 302. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 303. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425-26. 
 304. Amana Co. v. Eden Elec., Ltd., 543 U.S. 1150 (2005). 
 305. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 306. The 1:1 ratio was given greater weight after Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
554 U.S. 471, 514-15 (2008).  See cases cited supra note 113. 
 307. See Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 833 (8th         
Cir. 2004). 
 308. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 309. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 310. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 311. Id. 
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lion, not $500,000, the current marker.
312
  Yet, even re-adjusting the threshold 
for what is considered a “substantial” compensatory damage award back to 
$1 million, four of the seven cases would still be above a 1:1 ratio.
313
  The 
Eighth Circuit seems to err towards affirming higher ratios, even in cases 
with substantial compensatory awards.  
Despite its tendency to frequently affirm higher ratios of damages than 
suggested to be constitutional by State Farm, the Eighth Circuit has never 
reached the point of affirming a 5:1 ratio in a case in which damages were 
substantial.
314
  While this does have the desired effect of restricting outlier 
punitive damage awards,
315
 it also creates a pile-up of 4:1 ratio cases.
316
  
Stogsdill and Diesel Machinery are both 4:1 ratio cases that have a far lower 
reprehensibility score, yet have the same ratio as Ondrisek.
317
  This might be 
explained by the lower compensatory damages awarded in each, $500,000 
and $665,000 respectively.
318
  The court noted in both cases that the amount 
of compensatory damages awarded was “substantial,” as it also did in both 
Ondrisek and Eden Electrical, but the damages were still only about one fifth 
the amount of the awards in Ondrisek and Eden Electrical.  
4.  Comparable Punishments 
The third prong of the Gore Guideposts, comparable civil and criminal 
punishments, appears to be by far the least important factor for consideration 
in Eighth Circuit cases.  In three of the analyzed cases (Williams, Moore, and 
Stogsdill), the Eighth Circuit did a full analysis of criminal and civil punish-
ments.
319
  In one case the court did a very brief analysis of this Guidepost 
(Diesel Machinery).
320
  In five cases, no comparison was made by the court at 
all (White, JCB, Boerner, Eden Electrical, and Consenco).   
Ondrisek falls into the second category.  The court at least addressed the 
third Guidepost, but it reduced the entire analysis into two sentences.
321
  In 
  
 312. Recall that the Eighth Circuit determined in Stogsdill v. Healthmark Part-
ners, L.L.C., that a $500,000 compensatory damages award was held to be substantial. 
377 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 313. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 314. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 315. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 316. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 317. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 318. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 319. Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 791 (8th Cir. 2009);  
Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004); Stogsdill v. 
Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 320. Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 840 (8th     
Cir. 2005). 
 321. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1030 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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those two sentences, the court compared the damages in the instant case to 
those in Kolbeck and Miller but did not consider any other civil cases or po-
tential criminal punishments Alamo could have received, as the Gore Test 
requires them to do.  The only analysis the court did was to differentiate the 
facts of Ondrisek from the prior two cases involving abuse in TACM.
322
  The 
third prong of the Gore Test undeniably received short shrift from the Eighth 
Circuit in the instant case.  However, this might be a reflection of the fact that 
this Guidepost provides very little guidance, since all of the cases this author 
reviewed warranted significant criminal or civil liability.
323
  
C. The Problem & Solutions 
This review of Eighth Circuit cases with substantial compensatory dam-
ages awards reveals several disturbing trends.  The Gore Guideposts call     
for an evaluation of the constitutionality of punitive damages based upon    
the compensatory damages awarded, the final ratio, the reprehensibility of   




The first Guidepost, the ratio, has become the ultimate yardstick of con-
stitutionality in Eighth Circuit cases.  All of the jury awards were reduced in 
order to comply with Haslip’s 4:1 ratio requirement,
325
 if they were not al-
ready under that ratio.  The sole exception is Eden Electrical, whose addi-
tional 0.8 multiplier is hardly significant considering the 524:1 ratio the Su-
preme Court approved in TXO.
326
  Several awards have been cut down even 
further to 1:1 ratios, as per State Farm.
327
   This creates a pile up of cases 
with awards in the 4:1 ratio range and the 1:1 ratio range that are factually 
distinct but treated the same.  
The second Guidepost, reprehensibility, has been significantly deem-
phasized despite the Supreme Court’s claim that it is the most important fac-
tor to weigh when considering the constitutionality of punitive damages 
awards.
328
  This Guidepost’s importance has been replaced with the ratio of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages as the most relevant concern. 
Ondrisek had a slightly lower ratio than Eden Electrical, despite how much 
more compelling its Gore Factor analysis was.  This same mismatch of ratio 
and reprehensibility analysis holds true in the other eight cases with “substan-
tial” punitive damages awards reviewed by the Eighth Circuit. 
  
 322. Id. 
 323. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 324. See “Gore Guideposts as Applied to Eighth Circuit Cases” supra Part V.B. 
 325. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991). 
 326. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459, 462 (1993). 
 327. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 480, 425 (2003). 
 328. See supra Part V.B.2. 
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The third Guidepost, comparable punishments, has been even further re-
duced in importance.  Few cases gave this Guidepost more than a sentence of 
analysis, and in fully half of the cases no analysis was made.  
When the Supreme Court handed down the Gore Test, lower courts 
were to first consider the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, then the 
ratio of damages, and third, the severity of comparative civil and criminal 
punishments.  The Eighth Circuit today jumps straight to the ratio, glosses 
over the reprehensibility, and avoids consideration of comparable punish-
ments entirely.  This creates a baffling hierarchy of cases with no clear 
benchmark for trial courts to evaluate their cases against, which no doubt 
results in widely inconsistent punitive damages awards and frequent appeals.   
The Eighth Circuit is not wholly to blame, however.  The Gore Test,    
in an effort to provide greater guidance, has merely given courts semi-
objective criteria to use in making subjective judgments.  It has been critiqued 
from the start as giving a veneer of objectivity to a completely subjective 
process.
329
  As the dissenting justices in Gore predicted,
330
 the Guideposts 
provide little to no guidance.  It is no wonder that the Eighth Circuit has 
seized upon the ratio requirement as the main factor of punitive damages 
analysis; it only involves some quick math, no real analysis, and looks suita-
bly objective on paper.  
This problem has been further complicated in the Eighth Circuit by the 
ratio caps set forth in Haslip and State Farm.  Punitive damages are driven by 
an analysis of facts, and drawing bright line tests to analyze facts is notorious-
ly difficult.  This is why determinations of fact are often handed off to the 
jury to decide.  Instead, the Eighth Circuit is forced into a role where it must 
evaluate not only the facts of the case, but also the jury’s evaluation of those 
facts. It understandably attempts to circumnavigate these difficulties by af-
firming or overturning awards based upon pure numbers. Thus, the court 
mechanistically assigns cases almost uniformly at whole number integer mul-
tipliers clustered around the 4:1 and 1:1 marks – even when those cases are 
factually distinct from one another.  
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court needs to provide better guidance for 
evaluating punitive damages awards, and the Eighth Circuit needs to adhere 
to that advice more closely than they have adhered to the existing guidance  
in Gore.  The problem is clear: outlier juries award excessive punitive dam-
ages.  Perhaps instead of fixing the excessive damages, the better solution     
is to fix the outlier juries.  This could be accomplished by providing the jury 
with a revised set of jury instructions regarding the limits of punitive damag-
  
 329. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (U.S. 1996) (Scalia,           
J. dissenting).  
 330. See id. at 605 (“In truth, the ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere; they pro-
vide no real guidance at all.”); id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Gore Test “has only a vague concept of substantive due process, a ‘raised eyebrow’ 
test as its ultimate guide . . .”) (internal citation omitted). 
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss3/8
File: 7.Shands.F Created on: 1/27/2014 6:36:00 PM Last Printed: 1/27/2014 9:12:00 PM 
2013] PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ONDRISEK 949 
es.
331
  It could also be fixed by retrying only the issue of the amount of    
damages before a new jury.
332
  This would be feasible because there are rela-
tively few outlier juries,
333
 so retrials would be infrequent, and the new juries 
would be unlikely to also be outliers.  Moreover, a new trial on the issue       
of damages would encourage both parties to settle to avoid the costs of retry-
ing the case.  Or, one may simply defer to the jury’s determination, as Justice 
Scalia suggests in his dissent in TXO, since the punitive damages decision is  
a subjective decision “about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage” 





Ondrisek presents us with a chance to review Eighth Circuit jurispru-
dence through the lens of a model case.  Ondrisek has been the most factually 
reprehensible case to be appealed to the Eighth Circuit since State Farm was 
handed down, according to both common moral principles and the test the 
Supreme Court formulated in Gore.  The Eighth Circuit was presented with a 
chance to shed light on its application of the Gore Test and the constitutional 
amount of punitive damages.  Instead, however, the court declined to set 
aside its previous high-water mark ruling in Eden Electrical and sidestepped 
a comparison of the reprehensibility of the cases. 
  
 331. The Oklahoma legislature evidently thought along the same lines, as it 
amended its punitive damages law so that it now divides the procedure up into a two 
step process, and the jury decides the amount of damages according to a variable 
schedule.  See 8 Okla. Prac., Product Liability Law § 12:18 (2012 ed.) (citing 23 
Okla. Stat. § 9.1(B) (Supp. 2005) and Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions – Civil § 
5.6 (2002)).  
 332. Several courts seem to agree with this approach.  See, e.g., Bach v. First 
Union Nat. Bank, 149 F. App. 354, 366 (6th Cir. 2005) (“This fact compels the con-
clusion that the punitive damage award is duplicative, and that either a new trial on 
punitive damages or a remittitur of the damages awarded is appropriate.”) (emphasis 
added); CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 
392 (3d Cir. 2004) (The court “determined that the jury’s punitive damages determi-
nation must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on the question of puni-
tive damages.”); Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 120 P.3d 1260, 1284 (Ore. 
2005) (in an appeal based on excessive punitive damages in a bad faith insurance 
claim, the Supreme Court of Oregon ordered the case remanded for a new trial solely 
on the issue of punitive damages, unless the plaintiff agreed to a remitter of 3x the 
compensatory damages). 
 333. See, e.g., Joseph J. Chambers, IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: APPLICATION OF DUE 
PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 195, 
200-01 (2003) (quoting several sources refuting the perceived “punitive damages 
crisis” on the basis that this belief is “based upon anecdotal evidence derived only 
from a few well-known outlier cases”). 
 334. Gore, 517 U.S. at 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
33
Shands: Shands: Raised Eyebrow Test
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Shands – Final Formatting – 1/23/14 Created on:  1/27/2014 6:36:00 PM Last Printed: 1/27/2014 9:12:00 PM 
950 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
Although Ondrisek represents a missed opportunity, it still provides 
some illumination as to Eighth Circuit trends in punitive damages.  A com-
parison of other recent cases reveals that the Eighth Circuit tends to have a 
lower threshold than the Supreme Court for what constitutes a “substantial” 
compensatory award.  However, Ondrisek suggests that the threshold for 
what is “substantial” may have moved from $500,000 to $1 million.  On the 
other hand, while the Eighth Circuit is at least sometimes willing to accept a 
lower threshold for what constitutes a substantial award, it is willing to con-
sistently apply a higher ratio to those cases, despite the Supreme Court’s sug-
gestion in State Farm that a 1:1 ratio is appropriate.  
Contrasting Ondrisek with other cases also reveals certain trends that 
differ from Supreme Court jurisprudence.  A comparison between Ondrisek 
and Eden Electrical reveals that the ratio requirement may be the most im-
portant consideration for the Eighth Circuit when assessing a punitive damag-
es award, not the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct as the Supreme 
Court held in Gore.  Moreover, the third prong of the Gore Guideposts is de-
emphasized in most Eighth Circuit cases.  Many cases give it short shrift, and 
in some cases it is not analyzed at all. This subtle re-ordering of the emphasis 
placed on the Gore Guideposts has evidently not been severe enough for the 
Supreme Court to do something about it, as it has not granted certiorari to any 
of the ten cases reviewed.  Whatever the case may be, the Eighth Circuit 
missed a golden opportunity in Ondrisek to change the course of punitive 
damages in its jurisdiction, and it may have to wait another eight years before 
another case as unique as Ondrisek comes along. 
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APPENDIX A 
Presence of Gore Factors in Eight Circuit Cases with “Substantial” Damages 
 - = Gore factor is not present in case                                             X = Gore factor is present in case  
                     X = Gore factor is both present and particularly compelling in case 
  
 335. Consenco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 824-25 
(8th Cir. 2004). 
 336. Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 337. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 602-03 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
 338. Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 339. Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797-99 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 340. Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 832-34 (8th          
Cir. 2004). 
 341. Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 839-40 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
 342. JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, 539 F.3d 862, 875-77 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 343. Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 344. White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2010). 






























































































































- - - X X 2 1 
Ondrisek336 
Abuse in Cult 
X X X X X 5 4 
Boerner337 
Death of Smoker 
X X - X X 4 1 
Eden Electrical338 
Fake Dealership 
















- - - - X 1 0 
Moore343 
Insurance: Arson 
X X - X - 3 2 
White344 
Child Molestation 
X X - X X 3 2 
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